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On Causation and Comparison: Medical Malpractice and
other Professional Negligence After Steiner Corp. v.
Johnson & Higgins*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Now God cannot be directly the cause of sin, either in
Himself or in another, since every sin is a departure from
the order which is to God as the end .... In like manner,
neither can He cause sin indirectly. For it happens that
God does not give some the assistance, whereby they
may avoid sin, which assistance were He to give, they
would not sin . . . . It is therefore evident that God is
nowise a cause of sin. 1
God has many names, but fortunately for organized religion, "The
Initial Tortfeasor" is not one of them. 2 According to the Christian
philosopher St. Thomas Aquinas, apportioning any liability to God for
the sins of mortals would be entirely inappropriate since, as a matter of
law, "God cannot be directly the cause of sin."3 Certainly, such a
conventional interpretation of the statement presents an intriguing
theological idea. This note, however, offers a less reverent reading of
Aquinas' proposition.
It posits that when read in the context of tort law, Aquinas' reasoning
bears a striking resemblance to that employed by the Utah Supreme
4
Court in Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins ("Steiner Corp. IIF'). The
statement not only explains that God is not liable for the sins of

* Copyright c 2002 Ryan M. Springer. The author would like to thank Christine Durham, Kif
Augustine-Adams. and Denton M. Hatch for their assistance and guidance with this note. Any
errors. hrmcvcr arc solely the responsibility of the author.
I. 7 Sl TI!OMAS AQliiNAS, SUMMA TI!EOLO(;ICA 386-87 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., Burns Oates & Wash bourne Ltd. 2d cd. 1927) ( 1265-1273 ).
2. It is possible. however. that one might argue that God's liability for certain actions is
implicitly couched in such tort doctrines as the "act of God" defense. For an introduction to this
defense. absent any religious implications, s<'e DAN B. Dorms, TilE LAW OF TORTS§ 191 (2000)
rhereinaltcr D<lllllS].
3. A<)llll\/\S, suf!m note I. at 386.
4. 2000 UT 21, 996 1'.2d 531 rhcrcinaftcr .'i'teina Corp. Iff].
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humankind, but also provides an analogy that may be used to understand
the complicated doctrine of comparative negligence.
Steiner Corp. III dealt with Utah's comparative negligence laws,
which establish a system of damages apportionment intended to
distribute responsibility for the plaintiffs injuries among all the persons
and entities that contributed to the harm. 5 The court, applying Utah's
statutory scheme, held that liability for professional malpractice could
not be apportioned to a plaintiff who caused the preexistent condition
that created the need for the professional's assistance. The court
explained that a preexistent condition "cannot be the cause, either
proximate or direct, of the professional's failure to exercise an
appropriate standard of care in fulfilling his duties." 6
The holding of Steiner Corp. III marks a significant departure from
the common Jaw, but by doing so, it creates an appropriate balance of the
policy considerations underlying Utah's comparative apportionment
laws. As will be argued below, the Steiner Corp. III holding should also
extend to situations where the preexistent conditions were caused by
third-party tortfeasors as well as plaintiffs.
The first section of this note explains briefly the development of the
comparative negligence doctrine, including its statutory adoption in
Utah. 7 It also discusses two important interpretive cases as well as the
subsequent effect of the Liability Reform Act. 8 The second section
discusses the principal case, Steiner Corp. III, and several of the extrajurisdictional cases upon which it relies. The final section addresses the
policy considerations of Utah's apportionment system as applied in
medical malpractice situations.

5. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 67 (5th ed.
1984 & Supp. 1988) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON].
6. Id at 533.
7. This note does not extensively treat the development and dissemination of the
comparative negligence doctrine. For a comprehensive discussion of this issue and its particular
impact in Utah pre-Steiner Corp. 111 see Lee A. Wright, Comment, Utah's Comparative
Apportionment: What Happened to the Comparison? 1998 UTAH L. REV. 543, 546-559.
8. 1986 Utah Laws 470, (amending UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-27-40 (Supp. 1986) (repealing
tormer UTAH Cool' AN:-~.§ 78-27-40) (amended 1994)).
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ll. THE ADOPTION OF UTAH'S COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND
LIABILITY REFORM ACTS

A. The Common Law: Contributory Negligence

Although the doctrine of comparative negligence has roots as ancient
as its contributory negligence counterpart, 9 the latter doctrine was more
widely accepted by the common law. One of the earliest cases involving
contributory negligence is the 1809 case of Butte~field v. Forrester. 10 In
Butterfield, the plaintiff sustained injuries from being thrown from his
horse after it ran into debris negligently left in the road by the
defendant. 11 Reasoning that "[a] party is not to cast himself upon an
obstruction," Lord Ellenborough concluded that the plaintiff should be
prohibited from recovering damages from the defendant. 12
That reasoning gained favor throughout both England and America
and the defense of contributory negligence became widely accepted as an
absolute bar to recovery where a plaintiffs conduct contributed even
slightly to the injuries. 13 It was not long, however, before the doctrine's
application was limited. Courts started to recognize exceptions to the
absolute defense of contributory negligence in cases where the
defendant's conduct was intentional, wanton, or reckless, as well as in
cases where the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the injury. 14
Before its decline, however, contributory negligence enjoyed a
lengthy run in Utah, being accepted even prior to statehood 15 and lasting
through the early 1970s. 16 Nevertheless, Utah courts apparently struggled
with the outcomes of pure contributory negligence and soon joined the
other jurisdictions that recognized the various common exceptions. 17

9. See A. Chalmers Mole and Lyman P. Wilson, A Study ol Comparative Negligence, 17
CORNELL L.Q. 33 (1932); William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 475476. See also Wright, supra note 7, text accompanying notes 51-52.
I 0. I 03 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
I I. See id. at 926-27.
12. !d.
13. See DOBBS, supra note 2, § 199 at 194.
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 479 (1965); see also Fleming James, Jr.,
Contrihutory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691, 706-729 (1953).
15. See Lawrence & Mann v. Howard, I Utah 142 (1874).
16. See Bridges v. Union Pac. R. Co., 488 P.2d 738, 740 (Utah 1971) ('The common law
doctrine of contributory negligence has long been the rule of decision in the courts of this state,
and ... has attained a status similar to a statutory enactment. The legislative power of this state is
vested in the legislature ... and abrogation of the common-law doctrine of contributory negligence
should be by legislative enactment.").
17. See, eg, Holmgren v. Union Pac. R. Co., 198 P.2d 459,463 (Utah 1948) (recognizing
the "last clear chance" exception); Jensen v. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 138 P. 1185, 1190 (Utah 1914)
(recognizing exception where defendant's conduct manifested "reckless disregard").
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Even so, Utah was reluctant to abandon the doctrine altogether. IX But it
was only a matter of time until the harsh results of contributory
negligence were replaced in the majority of American jurisdictions,
including Utah.

B. The Rise of Comparative Negligence
1. Adoption of comparative negligence in Utah
Generally, comparative negligence is the term for a system of
damages apportionment based on the relative fault of all responsible
parties. 19 The doctrine resolves some of the inequities implicit in
contributory negligence by including the plaintiffs percentage of fault in
an apportionment of liability and then reducing the amount of the
judgment by that percentage, rather than operating as an absolute bar to
recovery. 20 Its increasing popularity was likely the result of the same
concerns that had motivated courts to develop the numerous exceptions
to contributory negligence.
State legislatures began to replace contributory negligence with
comparative negligence in the 1970s. 21 Utah joined the movement in
1973 by enacting its own Comparative Negligence Act. 22 In addition to
setting forth provisions for the new doctrine, the Comparative
Negligence Act expressly put an end to contributory negligence. 23
Somewhat paradoxically, however, Utah maintained the doctrine of
joint and several liability. Under this common law doctrine,
responsibility could be apportioned to multiple tortfeasors, but each
defendant was individually liable for the entire award. 24 Therefore, in
situations where one or more responsible parties were immune or
otherwise insolvent, the remaining defendants would have to pay
amounts of the judgment disproportionate to their share of fault. 25

18. See Myers v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R. Co., 116 P. 1119, 1121 (Utah 1911) (refusing to
apply comparative negligence); see also Bridges, 488 P.2d. at 740.
19. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLI<iFNCE, ~ 2-1 at 31 (3d ed. 1994 &
Supp. 2000) [hereinafter SCHWARTZ].
20. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 5, § 67.
21. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, §~ 1-4 to -5.
22. 1973 Utah Laws 710 (enacting UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 to -43 (Supp. 1973)
(repealed, revised, and reenacted 1986, amended 1994, 1996, 1999)).
23. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (Supp. 1985) (repealed, revised, and reenacted 1986,
amended 1994, 1996, 1999) ("Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any
person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence ... resulting in death or in
injury to person or property .... ").
24. See PROSSER AND KEETON§ 47, supra note 5.
25. See id. at 327-328 ("When joinder is permitted, it is not compelled, and each tortfcasor
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The only legal remedy available to a defendant who paid a
disproportionate share was a separate suit against the joint tortfeasors for
contribution. In some cases, such as those involving plaintiffs who
deliberately chose not to sue certain joint tortfeasors because of
impecuniosity, defendants would have little legal recourse at all and
would pay the price for another person's conduct. Whereas contributory
negligence placed undue burdens squarely on the plaintiffs shoulders,
joint and several liability placed burdens on solvent defendants. 26 At best
anomalous and at worst unjust, joint and several liability remained a part
of Utah's comparative negligence scheme for a number of years.

2. Incorporation of the "unit rule"
An additional consideration involved in comparative negligence
cases is the preliminary question of whether or not the negligence of
separate tortfeasors should be aggregated or weighed separately. In
1984, the Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue in Jensen v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. 27 Although the decision provides only a
sparse account of the facts, it explains that the decedent of the plaintiff
died as a result of negligence on the part of a physician and hospital. 28 A
jury apportioned 46 percent of the fault for the decedent's death on his
own negligence, and 18 and 36 percent on the physician and hospital,
respectively? 9 The jury awarded the plaintiff proportionate damages, but
the trial court set the judgment aside for no cause of action since the
decedent's own negligence exceeded that of either of the defendants'
. dIVI
.. dua II y.·10
m
The trial court's decision was consistent with the minority
"Wisconsin rule," which compares the fault of each defendant separately
against the fault of the plaintiff. 31 On appeal, however, the Utah Supreme
Court specifically incorporated the more widely accepted "unit rule,"
which aggregates the fault of multiple defendants and compares it with
the plaintiffs own. 32 Applying this rule, the court combined the

may be sued severally. and held responsible for the damage caused, although other wrongdoers have
contributed to it.").
2n. See id
27. n79 P2d 903 (Utah 1994).
28 !d
29. !d
30. !d. at 904. Under Utah's present comparative negligence statute, plaintiffs arc barred
from recovery where their own negligence amounts to titly percent or more of the total fault; see
UTAH CODE ANN. ~ 7S-27-3S ( 1996 & Supp. 200 I).
31 !d.
32. See id
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negligence of the defendants, thus making them collectively responsible
for 54 percent of the total fault, and remanded the case for entry of the
. ' s verd'tct.-:l3
JUry
Jensen is significant primarily for its adoption of the unit rule.
However, it also illustrates that under the Comparative Negligence Act in
1984, the negligence of the decedent was apportioned in a medical
malpractice action. Under Utah law, decedents possess the right to
commence wrongful death actions, but for obvious reasons, the right
vests in the decedent's personal representatives or heirs. 34 In Jensen, the
actual right of the action was the decedent's, and his negligence was
apportioned along with the professional negligence of the physician and
hospital. Therefore, the practical result of the Utah Supreme Court's
decision was the apportionment of the plaintiffs own negligence. As will
be discussed below, however, such apportionment of a plaintiffs
negligence was specifically rejected in Steiner Corp. III.

3. The Liability Reform Act
The legislative acts adopted in Utah and their underlying policies
provide some insight into the disparate outcomes in Jensen and Steiner
Corp. III. In 1986, the Utah Legislature revised the Comparative
Negligence Act by adopting the Liability Reform Act. 35 Although the
Reform Act retained some of the 1973 Comparative Negligence Act's
provisions, it also made some important changes. One such change was
the Reform Act's adoption of the term "comparative fault." 36 The
concept of "fault," which originally appeared in the Utah Supreme
Court's decision in Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 37 was ultimately
expanded to include both strict liabilit/ 8 and unknown or unidentified
tortfeasors. 39 Most importantly, however, the adoption of "comparative
fault" indicated the Utah Legislature's intent to significantly revise tort
liability by shifting the focus from traditional tort doctrines to the
singular inclusive concept of fault. 40

33. ld at 909.
34. See UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-11-12 (1996 & Supp. 2001 ).
35. See 1986 Utah Laws 470 (amending UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-40 (Supp. 1986)
(repealing former UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-40) (amended 1994)).
36. !d.
37. 628 P.2d 130 I (Utah 1981) (applying comparative fault in a products liability case).
38. See S.H. v. Bistryski, 923 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1996).
39. See Field v. Boyer, 952 P.2d I 078 (Utah 1998).
40. See Haff v. Hettich, 1999 NO 94, ~ 14, 593 N.W. 2d 383, 387. See also infra text
accompanying notes 93-105.
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Additionally, the express abandonment of the doctrine of joint and
several liability further demonstrates the legislature's intent. The new
statute declared that "no defendant shall be liable to any person seeking
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributed to
that defendant." 41 This language illustrated the Legislature's
dissatisfaction with the inequitable distribution of liability among parties
present under the common law systems. Moreover, these legislative
changes helped establish the doctrinal landscape for the Steiner Corp. III
decision.
C. Apportionment and Adjudication

When considering the judicial applications of the Utah Legislature's
statutory reform, it is important to keep in mind three of the major
purposes of tort law. First, tort law exists to deter wrongful conduct. 42 If
persons are aware that there will be financial consequences for
irresponsible behavior, they will be less likely to engage in tortious
conduct. 43 Second, tort law encourages socially responsible behavior. 44
By holding liable parties financially accountable for the consequences of
their actions, persons have an incentive to behave responsibly. 45 And
finally, tort law serves to restore injured parties to their original condition
by calculating damages and awarding financial remuneration. 46
Comparative negligence involves all of these policy considerations, but
through its system of apportionment, focuses more immediately on the
accountability concerns inherent in the second. As illustrated by the
cases below, it is often difficult to satisfy all of the policy concerns
equally.
In 1993, several cases tested new language of the Reform Act while
balancing the fundamental interests of tort law. 47 The first of the postReform Act cases to reach the Utah Supreme Court, Sullivan v. Scoular
Grain Co., 48 is a significant benchmark in comparative fault
jurisprudence in Utah. 49 The case involved a personal injury claim
41. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-27-38 (1996 & Supp. 2001 ).
42. See DOBBS, supra note 2, § I.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See Dahl v. Kerbs Constr. Co., 853 P.2d 887 (Utah 1993); Brown v. Boyer-Washington
Boulevard Assoc. v. CCC & T, 856 P.2d 352 (Utah 1993); Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp. v.
Projects Unlimited, Corp., 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993).
48. 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993).
49. For discussion on the impact of Sullivan, see Dale T. Hansen, Sullivan v. Scoular Grain
Co.: Apportioning the Fault of' Immune Employers, 1994 BYU L. REV. 187; Geoffrey C. Haslam,
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arising from a workplace accident. 50 Sullivan sued multiple defendants,
including his employer, who was immune under the exclusive remedy
provision of Utah's Workers' Compensation Law. 51
Sullivan arrived at the Utah Supreme Court as two certified questions
from the Federal District Court of Utah. 52 First, the District Court asked
if Utah's comparative negligence scheme allowed "a jury [to] apportion
the fault of the plaintiffs employers that caused or contributed to the
accident although said employers are immune from suit"; and second,
whether a jury could "apportion the fault of an individual or entity that
has been dismissed from the litigation but against whom it is claimed that
they have caused or contributed to the accident." 53
Sullivan balanced the policy interests of restoring the plaintiff to his
original condition with encouraging socially responsible behavior in
situations where a partially accountable tortfeasor is immune from the
judgment. If liability were apportioned to the immune employer, its
immunity would relieve it of the financial responsibilities to the plaintiff.
Consequently, the plaintiff could not fully recover and would therefore
not be returned to his original condition.
Conversely, if the immune employer were not included in the
apportionment, the percentage of its fault would not be determined,
which would potentially yield three results. First, the employer would not
be notified of the extent of its fault, and therefore would presumably not
know what corrective measures it might need to enact to prevent future
injuries. Second, assuming the employer was aware of the nature of its
duty, not apportioning a percentage of fault would encourage future
recklessness since there could be no financially adverse consequence.
And finally, since the percentage of the employer's fault would not be
factored into the total damages equation, the remaining tortfeasors would
have to share the financial responsibility for the employer's fault, thus
effectively resurrecting the inequities of joint and several liability.
Clearly, neither option could be entirely consistent with the
legislative rejections of contributory negligence and joint and several
liability and satisfy the attending policy concerns. Nevertheless, the court
had to decide the issue based on the existing statutory language. Doing

Apportioning the Comparative Fault of Non-party Joint Tortfeasors, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 444; Tim
D. Dunn & W. Brent Wilcox, Significant Changes in Comparative Fault and Workers·
Compensation Reimbursement, UTAH B.J. Aug.-Sept. 1994; Lee Edwards, Sullivan v. Scoular Grain
Co. and the 1994 Amendments: Is Joint and Several Liability Really Dead in Utah?, 9 BYU J. PUB.
L. 327.
50. See Sullivan, 853 P.2d. at 878.
51. Jd.
52. !d.
53. !d.

\

\
\

I
I
1,

\

'
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so, the majority answered the District Court's first question
affirmatively. The Utah Supreme Court explained that "apportionment of
fault does not of itself subject the employer to civil liability. Rather, the
apportionment process merely ensures that no defendant is held liable to
any claimant for an amount of damages in excess of the percentage of
fault attributable to that defendant." 54
On the second question, however, the court held that "an individual
or entity dismissed from a case pursuant to an adjudication on the merits
of the liability issue may not be included in the apportionment,"
explaining that "[ w ]hen a defendant is dismissed due to a determination
of lack of fault as a matter of law, the defendant's exclusion from
apportionment does not subject the remaining defendants to liability for
damages in excess of their proportionate fault." 55
Although the decision was consistent with "the statutory scheme
56
viewed in its entirety," Justice Stewart vigorously dissented because of
the policy shortcomings implicit in the result. 57 Recognizing that the
statutory language indicated the Legislature's intent to exclude the
negligence of non-immune persons, he argued that through abolishing
joint and several liability, the Reform Act "divide[d] the fault of an
immune party among both plaint!ff~ and defendants." 58 Justice Stewart
disagreed with the majority because its interpretation "load[ ed] ... fault
entirely onto a plaintiff," thus returning to the inequity of abandoned
common law doctrines. 59
As indicated by the majority and dissenting opinions in Sullivan, the
revised statutory scheme resulted in significant tension between the
various policy considerations implicit in comparative negligence analysis
and the statutory language. Seeking to alleviate that tension, the
Legislature created a more accommodating balance between the interests
of plaintiffs and defendants. In 1996, the Legislature responded to
Sullivan by creating a new framework for liability apportionment in

!d.
55. !d.
56. Brown v. Boyer-Washington Boulevard Assoc. v. CCC & T, 856 P.2d 352 at 355 (Utah
1993) (Durham, J., concurring). See also Wright, supra note 7, at 577 (noting that the "inconsistency
between the use of the terms 'person' and 'party' in the statute may show a lack of intent to limit the
parties to whom fault can be attributed").
57. See Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877 at 886 (Utah 1993).
58. !d. (Stewart, J. dissenting) (emphasis in original). Justice Stewart's view, however,
assumes that jurors would be "naturally inclined" to allocate the immune tortfeasor's fault among the
plaintiffs and defendants. While this view is arguably more equitable, the fact remains that the
statutory language provided no instructive mechanism to guide the jurors' inclinations, even if
Justice Stewart's optimistic appraisal of human nature was correct.
59. !d
54.
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cases involving immune tortfeasors. 60 The new system, still in place,
provides that the liability of immune persons can be apportioned so long
as the total percentage of their fault is less than 40 percent. 01 If the
immune person's fault exceeds 40 percent, however, courts are to reduce
the percentage of fault to zero and reallocate that percentage among the
other parties in proportion to the percentage of fault "initially attributed
to each party by the fact finder. " 62
Ultimately, Sullivan and the subsequent statutory amendments
illustrate the emphasis Utah's comparative negligence scheme places on
accountability. Utah's statute is less concerned with the standing of
parties vis-a-vis non-parties than with appropriately determining
percentages of fault. And despite its attending controversies, Sullivan
shows the difficultly in addressing accountability in light of other
procedural obstacles. The statutory amendment, however, demonstrates
the Legislature's desire to be as equitable as possible to parties in
interest, regardless of the formal standing of parties.
Ill. THE NEXT STEP: STEINER CORP. V. JOHNSON & HIGGINS

A. History of the Case
Steiner Corp., a privately owned leasing corporation, established a
retirement plan to provide benefits for its employees. 63 Under the plan,
employees were entitled to receive either a monthly annuity or a lump
sum distribution as the retirement benefit. 64 Over time, the lump sum
formula was modified into a layered formula that calculated payments
based on fixed interest rates. 65 The monthly annuity, however, was paid
out according to fluctuating market rates, and consequently, the lump
sum option was more valuable than the monthly annuity. 66 In 1977, the
firm of Johnson & Higgins was hired as the actuary for the retirement
plan. 67 Although the majority of Steiner Corp.'s employees chose the
more valuable lump sum, Johnson & Higgins evaluated the retirement
plan based on the value of the annuities. 68 As a result, the retirement plan

60. See UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-27-39(2)(a) (1996 & Supp. 2001 ).
61. !d.
62. !d.
63. Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins of California, 31 F.3d 935, 936 (I Oth Cir. 1994) cert.
denied, 513 U.S. I 081, (1995) [hereinafter Steiner Corp.!].
64. !d. at 937.
65. !d.
66. !d.
67. !d.

68. !d.
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valuations substantially understated the value of the benefits and costs
that Steiner Corp. had incurred. 69
In 1988, Steiner Corp. sued Johnson & Higgins for professional
malpractice and breach of contract. 70 The trial court ultimately ruled
partially in Steiner Corp.'s favor but rejected the primary claim for
professional malpractice on the basis of Johnson & Higgins' contributory
negligence defense. 71 Both sides appealed, and the Tenth Circuit
affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded on the
.
.
72
apportiOnment Issue.
On remand, the trial court again rejected Steiner Corp.'s professional
malpractice claims because under Utah's comparative negligence statute,
Steiner Corp.'s negligence was comparatively greater than that of
Johnson & Higgins. 73 Steiner Corp. appealed, arguing the trial court
erred in finding Steiner's negligence comparatively greater than that of
Johnson & Higgins. 74 The Tenth Circuit again reversed and remanded for
a determination of causation and damages. 75
B. The Steiner Corp. Ill Decision: A Clear Direction for Utah's
Comparative Negligence Scheme
Upon receiving the Tenth Circuit's directions on remand, the trial
court certified two legal questions to the Utah Supreme Court. 76 The first
question was whether, under Utah law, negligent acts "causing or
contributing to the situation that the plaintiff hired a professional to
resolve can be the basis for comparative or contributory negligence
defense." 77 The second question was whether negligent acts "causing or
contributing to the situation the plaintiff hired a professional to resolve
can be considered in determining causation and damages."n The court
answered "no" to both questions, holding that in spite of an actor's
negligence in causing a preexistent condition, he or she "cannot be held
to be contributorily negligent unless their negligence is causally

69. !d.
70. Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins of California, 135 F.3d 6R4, 685 (lOth Cir. 1998)
[hereinafter Steiner Corp. II].
71/d
72. See Steiner Corp. I.
73. Steiner Corp. II at 6R5.
74. !d.
75. !d. at 694.
76. Steiner Corp. Ill, 200 I UT 21, ~ I, 996 P.2d 531, 531-32.
77. !d.
78. !d.
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connected" to the specific injury from which plaintiffs complaint seeks
reiief. 79
Although the facts in Steiner Corp. III dealt with an actuarial firm,
the Utah Supreme Court also addressed other forms of professional
malpractice in its holding.xo The court specifically stated that this
principle mutually barred comparative and contributory negligence
defenses "regarding medical ... services. ,x 1 Referring to the facts from a
82
the court stated that because
Texas medical malpractice case,
negligence relating to a patient's preexistent condition "was not
'simultaneous[ ] with or cooperating with' the fault for which the
plaintiff sought recovery," the contributory negligence defense could not
83
be raised. Additionally, the court recognized that conduct relating to a
preexistent medical condition "was not allowed as a defense because the
84
malpractice caused a 'distinct subsequent injury, "' and that such
instances of professional negligence were '"intervening or superseding
cause[s]' without which there would have been no injury at all."x 5
This decision and its interpretation of Utah's comparative
apportionment scheme have yet to be applied in a medical malpractice
case. However, based on the reasoning of the opinion and the evidence of
policy concerns implicit in various statutory revisions, it is apparent that
its application will mark a significant departure from the common law in
medical malpractice cases. More importantly, perhaps, that departure
will enact the equitable considerations at the heart of comparative
apportionment.
IV. COMPARATIVE FAULT APPORTIONMENT IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
CASES POST-STE!NtR COJW Ill

A. Medical Malpractice Jurisprudence and the Common Lav.·
Medical malpractice cases require a showing of burden beyond
conventional negligence cases. In order to prove medical malpractice, the
79. !d. at ,[4, 532.
80. !d. at 5, 532 ("When applying these principles to professional negligence, other courts
have barred contributory negligence defenses based on the plaintiffs actions taken before obtaining
the services of a professional. The defenses have been barred regarding medicaL legal, and
accounting services." (citations omitted)).
81. !d., at ,1~ 5-6, 532, citing Sendejar v. Alice Physicians & Surgeons Hosp .. Inc., 555
S.W.2d 879 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Matthews v. Williford, 318 So.2d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975):
Bourne v. Seventh Ward Gen. Hosp. 54 So.2d 197 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
82. Sendejar at 885.
83. Steiner Corp. !II at ,[6, 532-33.
84. !d. at ,[6, 533, citing Mal/hews at 483.
85. !d., citing Bourne at 203.

,I
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plaintiff must prove ( 1) the standard of care required of physicians under
similar circumstances practicing in the same field or specialty, (2) that
the applicable standard of care was breached, (3) that the injury to the
plaintiff was proximately caused by the defendant's negligence, and (4)
that damages occurred as a result of the defendant's breach of duty. 86
In traditional tort law, proximate cause is generally a question of fact
and is to be decided by the jury. 87 Malpractice cases, however, present
some qualifications to this general rule. As the Utah Court of Appeals
has explained, "[b ]ecause of the complex issues involved in a
determination of proximate cause in a medical malpractice case, the
plaintiff must provide expert testimony establishing that the health care
provider's negligence proximately caused plaintiffs injury." 88 The Utah
Supreme Court has recognized proximate cause in the context of
professional malpractice as "that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by efficient intervening cause, produces injury and
without which the result would not have occurred."89 The court added
that proximate cause is also "the efficient cause which necessarily sets in
operation the factors that accomplish the injury."90
This concept of proximate cause is consistent with the common law
doctrine articulated in the Restatement. Section 457 of the Restatement
states, "If the negligent actor is liable for another's injury, he is also
subject to liability for any additional bodily harm resulting from normal
efforts of third persons in rendering aid which the other's injury
reasonably requires, irrespective of whether such acts are done in a
proper or negligent manner." 91 Under this doctrine, parties who are the
proximate cause of a plaintiffs injuries are liable for damages resulting
from foreseeable consequences of the original tort. 92
R6. Dalley v. Utah Valley Reg'! Medical Ctr., 791 P.2d 193, 195 (Utah 1990). See also
Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348,354 n. 17 (Utah 1980) (holding that the plaintiff has the burden to
prove that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury).
87. Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, ,[22, 990 P.2d 933, 938.
88. Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 930 P.2d 904 (Utah App. 1997). See also Chadwick v.
Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah App. 19R8) ("Due to the technical and complex nature of a
medical doctor's services, expert medical testimony must be presented at trial in order to establish
the standard of care and proximate cause.").
89. Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996). See also Mahmood, at~ 22, 938;
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 106 (Utah 1992); State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479,482 n.3 (Utah
1984).
90. Har/ine,912P.2dat439(Utah 1996).
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 457 (1965).
92. See id, cmt. a
("[D]amages assessable against the actor include not only the injury originally caused by
the actor's negligence but also the harm resulting from the manner in which the medical,
surgical, or hospital services are rendered, irrespective of whether they are rendered in a
mistaken or negligent manner, so long as the mistake or negligence is of the sort which is
recognized as one of the risks which is inherent in the human fallibility of those who
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This policy makes sense when considered under the traditional joint
and several liability schemes that were in place when the Restatement
was drafted. Under joint and several liability, plaintiffs could still recover
fully for damages from negligent medical practitioners even if the
original tortfeasor were insolvent or otherwise unavailable, so long as the
negligent practitioners were parties to the case. But as the cases
discussed below illustrate, the wisdom of the Restatement's position is
suspect when considered in light of the policy concerns inherent in
contemporary comparative apportionment schemes.

B. Extra-Jurisdictional Support
State courts have begun to recognize that it is inappropriate to
apportion liability for malpractice to initial parties, whether plaintiffs or
third parties. For example, North Dakota's Supreme Court recently held
in Haffv. Hettich that "an original tortfeasor is not liable ... for damages
caused by medical malpractice in treating the original injury.'m In that
case, the plaintiff had been injured in an automobile accident with the
defendant. 94 The plaintiff sought treatment for his injuries from the
accident from a chiropractor, who subsequently administered negligent
care. 95 The plaintiff argued in accordance with the common law that
"subsequent improper medical treatment is a direct and proximate
consequence of an original tortfeasor's acts.'' 96 The court, applying a
comparative apportionment scheme materially comparable to Utah's,
disagreed. 97 They explained:
We dec! ine to construe the [comparative fault statute] to
impose liability on an original tortfeasor for an
intervening cause like medical malpractice that the
original tortfeasor was deemed to foresee under common
law, because that interpretation would render
meaningless the language for determining the percentage
of fault and damages attributable to each person and for
allocating several liability to each party for the amount

render such services."). !d.
93. 1999 NO 94, ,[14, 593 N.W. 2d 383, 385.
94. !d. at ,[2, 385.
95. !d.
9ti. !d. at ,[9, 386.
97. North Dakota has also adopted "comparative fault" language and follows the unit rule.
Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-38 (4) (1996 & Supp. 2001) with N.D. CENT. CODE§ 32-03.20 I to -02 ( 1996 ); See also Mark Richard Hanson, Comment, Negligence- The Unit Rule and North
Dakota's Comparative Negligence Statute, 64 N.D. L. REV. 135 ( 1998).
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of damages attributable to the percentage of fault of that
party. 98
HajJ clearly and capably illustrates the appropriateness of extending
Steiner Corp. JJJ's holding to cover all original tortfeasors, not merely
plaintiffs, that cause preexisting conditions for which medical attention is
sought.
Additionally, this conclusion is implicitly supported by one of the
cases cited to in the Steiner Corp. III opinion, Lamoree v. Binghamton
General Hospita/. 99 In that case, a woman shot a man in the leg while he
was attempting to enter the woman's mother's home. 100 The defendant
hospital subsequently admitted the man for treatment of the gunshot
wound, where after nearly eighteen hours of waiting, he died. 101
Ironically, the woman who shot the decedent was his estranged
companion, and as such, became the administrator of his estate. 102 This
gave her the legal standing to sue for wrongful death in his behalf, so she
brought malpractice suits against the hospital and the attending
physician. 103 The defendants argued that since "the death of the
plaintiffs intestate and the damages and injuries referred to in the
plaintiffs complaint were caused or contributed to, in whole and part, by
the plaintiff administratrix and by the plaintiffs intestate," that
consideration of comparative negligence was appropriate. 104 The court,
however, held:
Any tortious acts of the defendants ... were successive
and independent of any act of the plaintiff and the
decedent. ... Since the complaints allege negligence on
the part of the defendants after admission to the hospital,
any conduct on the part of the plaintiff administratrix or
the plaintiff's intestate before admission to the hospital
should not be considered as a defense by the defendants
for any negligence or improper treatment after the
plaintiff's intestate was admitted to the hospital. 105
Lamoree perfectly illustrates the immateriality of a party's standing
when applying comparative negligence analysis. Based on the New York
court's reasoning, the outcome would have been the same with regard to
Ms. Lamoree's contribution to the injury regardless of whether she was
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Haffat 'IJ9, 386.
329 N.Y.S. 2d 85 ( 1972).
!d. at 87-88.
!d. at 87.
Jd
!d.
!d.
!d. at 90 (emphasis added).
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the plaintiff or merely a third-party tortfeasor. It was little more than
coincidence that she, as the initial tortfeasor, also became the plaintiff in
behalf of the decedent. The logic of the case, as well as its role in the
Steiner Corp. III holding, justifies Utah's departure from common law
medical malpractice jurisprudence, and warrants the extension of the
holding to third parties as well as plaintiffs.
C. Policy Shifts, Comparative Fault, and Medical Malpractice

Under the common law, concerns about proportionate distribution of
fault and equitable apportionment of liability were not as important as
punitive deterrence, as indicated by the harshness of contributory
negligence and joint and several liability. The recent directions taken in
Utah's comparative apportionment jurisprudence and legislation,
however, illustrate that fairness and accountability have become primary
policy considerations in Utah and other jurisdictions. Currently, courts
seek to determine actual fault and allocate financial responsibility
accordingly.
Steiner Corp. III clearly reflects this attention to equity in its holding.
The court explained that for someone to be contributorily negligent, "his
negligence must relate or contribute to the alleged injury caused by the
professional stemming from the professional relationship." 106 It is
impractical to think that the negligence or fault of one actor in creating a
preexisting condition could actually contribute to the professional's
negligence. It is also impractical to think that Steiner Corp. Ill's
reasoning should apply only to plaintiffs and not to third-party tortfeasors
as well. In unequivocal language, without reference to the legal standing
of any party, the Utah Supreme Court stated "that a preexisting condition
that a professional is called upon to resolve cannot be the cause, either
proximate or direct, of the professional's failure to exercise an
appropriate standard of care in fulfilling his duties." 107
Additionally, Steiner Corp. JJI reflects attention to policy concerns of
actual accountability. The court noted that attributing fault for a
professional's malpractice to another actor "would allow professionals to
avoid responsibility for the very duties they undertake to perform." 108
Considering the common law systems of apportionment, however, it is
apparent that attention to accountability was not a primary concern. It is

106. Steiner Corp. Ill, 2001 UT 21. ,[4. 996 P.2d 531, 532.
107. !d. at~ 7, 533 (emphasis added).
108. !d.
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also apparent that not only should Steiner Corp. III be recognized as a
109
departure from the common law, but also as a welcome one.

D. Medical Malpractice Jurisprudence after Steiner Corp. Ill
If Steiner Corp. III's language is taken on its face, the apportionment
of an initial tortfeasor's fault in professional negligence cases under the
third element of proving medical malpractice is automatically excluded.
The holding, as a matter of law, eliminates the ability to determine
proximate cause for malpractice because "a preexisting condition that a
professional is called upon to resolve cannot be the cause, either
proximate or direct, of the professional's failure to exercise an
appropriate standard of care in fulfilling his duties." 110
This conclusion effectively sustains the Liability Reform Act's
abandonment of the joint tortfeasor doctrine. Additionally, Steiner Corp.
111 dealt with a preexistent condition caused by the plaintiffs, which
would traditionally have been subject to a contributory negligence
analysis. However, the court implicitly acknowledged the immateriality
of the parties' legal standing, explaining that although answering
certi fled questions dealing with what was traditionally subject to the
doctrine of contributory negligence, "[s]ince comparative principles have
previously been applied in cases dealing with contributory negligence,
we will address the two doctrines together." 111 Ultimately, the conclusion
advances Utah comparative fault jurisprudence beyond the common
law's traditional restraints and justifications.

109. It should also he noted that Utah's ahility to move in such a direction is somewhat
unique. Compared with other jurisdictions where comparative negligence statutes are to be
interpreted in derogation to the common law, such progress could not occur. For instance, Florida,
despite a comparative negligence scheme similar to Utah's, is required to interpret the doctrine with
deference to the common law. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. McDonald, 676 So. 2d 12, ](,(Fla. Dist.
Ct. /\pp. 1996) ("'fking in derogation of the common law,.
Florida Statues must be strictly
construed in favor of the common law." (citations omitted)). Utah's Legislature, however, has
provided that:
The rule of !he eommon law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed
has not application to the statutes of this state. The statutes estahlish the laws of this state
respecting subjects to which they relate, and their provisions and all proceedings under
them are to he liberally cons\ rued with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to
promote .Justice. Whenever there is any variance between the mlcs of equity and the mles
of co1n1non law 111 reference lo the same matter, the rules of equity shall prevail.
lJ lA II ( CHJI /\1\'1. 0 6X-]-2 (I 996 & Supp. 2001)
II 0 .')rei ncr ( 'mp. Ill at 7, 533.
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the plaintiff or merely a third-party tortfeasor. It was little more than
coincidence that she, as the initial tortfeasor, also became the plaintiff in
behalf of the decedent. The logic of the case, as well as its role in the
Steiner Corp. Ill holding, justifies Utah's departure from common law
medical malpractice jurisprudence, and warrants the extension of the
holding to third parties as well as plaintiffs.
C. Policy Shifts, Comparative Fault, and Medical Malpractice

Under the common law, concerns about proportionate distribution of
fault and equitable apportionment of liability were not as important as
punitive deterrence, as indicated by the harshness of contributory
negligence and joint and several liability. The recent directions taken in
Utah's comparative apportionment jurisprudence and legislation,
however, illustrate that fairness and accountability have become primary
policy considerations in Utah and other jurisdictions. Currently, courts
seek to determine actual fault and allocate financial responsibility
accordingly.
Steiner Corp. Ill clearly reflects this attention to equity in its holding.
The court explained that for someone to be contributorily negligent, "his
negligence must relate or contribute to the alleged injury caused by the
professional stemming from the professional relationship." 106 It is
impractical to think that the negligence or fault of one actor in creating a
preexisting condition could actually contribute to the professional's
negligence. It is also impractical to think that Steiner Corp. lll's
reasoning should apply only to plaintiffs and not to third-party tortfeasors
as well. In unequivocal language, without reference to the legal standing
of any party, the Utah Supreme Court stated "that a preexisting condition
that a professional is called upon to resolve cannot be the cause, either
proximate or direct, of the professional's failure to exercise an
appropriate standard of care in fulfilling his duties." 107
Additionally, Steiner Corp. Ill reflects attention to policy concerns of
actual accountability. The court noted that attributing fault for a
professional's malpractice to another actor "would allow professionals to
avoid responsibility for the very duties they undertake to perform." 108
Considering the common law systems of apportionment, however, it is
apparent that attention to accountability was not a primary concern. It is

I 06. Steiner Corp. Jfl, 200 I UT 21, ~]4. 996 P.2d 531, 532.
107. ld at~ 7, 533 (emphasis added).
108 Jd

